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Abstract
This article investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do
so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post-war period. We use two measures
of political competition: one that captures the extent to which political power can be freely contested regardless of election results and one based
on vote share at last parliamentary elections. Our results, based on static and dynamic panel estimators, show unambiguously that the higher the
level of political competitions is, the higher the agricultural protection.
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1. Introduction
A large literature in political economy has now emerged,
which studies the effect of political institutions on policy out-
comes (for an overview see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
Attention has been paid to both developing theoretical under-
standing as well as to empirical analysis of the specific fea-
tures of political system granting privileges to some groups
and entailing systematic biases in aggregate spending. Much of
the effort has been spent on documenting the relationship be-
tween democracy and economic outcomes (e.g., Giavazzi and
Tabellini, 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Persson
and Tabellini, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2008; Przeworski
et al., 2000; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005).
These studies have remarkably deepened our understanding
of the sources of large cross-country differences in institutions
and economic performance. However, this literature documents,
by and large, the role of a broad cluster of democratic institu-
tions leaving open the question on what specific institutional
features are more important for the policy process of interest.
Given the well-established theoretical arguments as well as het-
erogeneous effect of democracy observed in reality, there is a
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need for more in-depth research studying what particular insti-
tutional arrangements determine policies of one sort or another
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
Having this in mind, this article tries to investigate to what
extent economic policy outcomes may depend on political com-
petition, that is, the intensity of the challenge political parties
face from each other (Roemer, 2006).1 More specifically, our
goal is to estimate the effect of political competition on the level
of agricultural protection. Agriculture constitutes an interesting
case for a variety of reasons. To start with, agricultural policy
is often presented as a classic example of a policy that benefits
narrowly defined interests of farmers (Persson and Tabellini,
2000). Nevertheless, the mechanism at work behind this sys-
tematic bias still needs better understanding. In addition, rightly
or not, agricultural protection is often presented as a bone of
contention in the WTO negotiations. While our aim is not to
generalize the determinants of agricultural protection to other
sectors, we believe that the study of sectoral protection pro-
vides an insight into the understanding of trade policy, which is
concealed in the analysis of aggregate trade openness.
1 Alternatively, political competition could be defined as the degree of control
that masses have over political elite (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Note that
from both these perspectives, political competition could be seen as a form of
constraint on political elites.
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By doing so, this article aims to contribute to the strand of the
literature that tries to make progress in understanding the im-
pact of political institutions on agricultural support. A growing
number of recent articles have investigated how various aspects
of political organization of a society affect agricultural policy
outcomes (for an overview see Swinnen, 2010). These articles
have examined agricultural protection from the point of view of
the impact of democratic transitions (Olper et al., 2013), elec-
toral rules (Olper and Raimondi, 2013), party ideology (Dutt
and Mitra, 2010), or political liberties (Swinnen et al., 2000).
Our article differs from earlier studies in its focus on the
role of political competition, an issue which has received rel-
atively scarce attention (notable exceptions include Bates and
Block, 2010; Gawande and Hoekman, 2010).2 This may be of
importance for at least three reasons. First, the existing stud-
ies document that agricultural protection depends on political
regime and, especially, electoral rules (see, Olper et al., 2013;
and Olper and Raimondi, 2013). More specifically, the level of
protection increases with transitions to democracy and is higher
under proportional representation. However, there is still a great
deal of heterogeneity in the level of protection among democra-
cies and among proportional systems which needs explanation.
Given that elections are one of the main democratic institution,
political competition may provide some interesting insights into
the subject of this heterogeneity. Second, focusing on electoral
rules (majoritarian vs. proportional) leaves out number of issues
that may be of importance for policy choices. One of them is
surely the distribution of political power within political elite
and/or between the citizens and political elite, which will de-
termine potential threat for current incumbents being replaced.
Again, investigating the role of political competition may be
informative in this respect. Finally, as argued in other studies,
the impact of political institutions on agricultural policy may be
transmitted through different channels depending on the struc-
ture of the economy (see e.g., Olper et al., 2013). It is important
therefore to note that looking at political competition allows
to take this potential heterogeneity into account. In developing
countries political elites cannot please broad constituency with-
out favoring agricultural interests. In developed countries, on
the other hand, agricultural electorate, although being marginal,
may be regarded as swing/pivotal voters. In consequence, in
both these settings the presence of fierce political competition
may result in an increased support for agriculture but for quite
different reasons.
To study the impact of political competition on agricultural
protection, we exploit both cross-country as well as within-
country variation in the political and economic data from 74
countries for the period 1955–2005. Our results show that
agricultural protection is positively correlated with political
competition. As such, they are consistent with empirical and
theoretical contributions to the political economy literature
pointing to a positive association between political competi-
2 For the importance of electoral channels in transmitting the interest of
agricultural/rural population see also Varshney (1995) or Bates (2007).
tion and government spending. Our findings are robust across
different measures of political competition, to the usage of ad-
ditional covariates and across various subsamples. Importantly,
they remain qualitatively the same when we switch from fixed
effects to dynamic panel models to address potential endo-
geneity problem due to time-varying unobservable factors. In
the latter case however, our results for the measure of political
competition based on election outcomes are slightly less robust.
2. Related literature
Although there exists a large literature dealing with agricul-
tural protection (for an overview see de Gorter and Swinnen,
2002; Swinnen, 2010; and citations therein), to the best of our
knowledge the link between political competition (i.e., the in-
tensity of the challenge political parties face from each other;
Roemer, 2006) and the level of agricultural protection is very
poorly documented.3 This is somewhat surprising given a large
political economy literature studying the link between politi-
cal competition and public policies (see e.g., Besley and Case,
2003; Cox, 2008; Roemer, 2001, 2006). While the focus of
this literature has not been on agricultural policy, its general
predictions could be very useful to deepen our understanding
of factors determining the level of protection in this particular
sector. Below we briefly review a few theoretical contributions
that may help to establish the link between political competition
and agricultural protection. The arguments that we quote allow
to hypothesize a positive relationship. This positive link could
be expected both in developing and in developed countries but
for quite different reasons.
Throughout our discussion we will assume that politicians
and political parties are opportunistic and care only about win-
ning upcoming elections. This in turn suggests that the objective
of political parties is to maximize their seat share in the par-
liament. As far as voters are concerned, on the other hand, we
assume that they make the decision about whom to support
based on the policies proposed (and/or implemented before)
by particular parties. The ultimate choice that voters make de-
pends on the extent to which these policies are in line with
voters’ preferences and thus to what extent these policies allow
to increase voters’ expected utility.4
3 There is also relatively scarce evidence on the link between political com-
petition and trade policy in general. One of the few exceptions include Hillman
and Ursprung (1993) who study this relationship also in combination with
multinational firms. There exist however, a number of contributions investigat-
ing the effect of democracy on trade (see e.g., Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005;
Milner and Kubota, 2005; O’Rurke and Taylor, 2007; among others). Although
not directly, they could also be related to the analysis of political competition.
Provided our focus, particularly interesting are findings by Persson (2005) who
shows that democracies defined as parliamentary systems or with proportional
electoral formula enact more open trade policy.
4 This is not to say that voters’ decision is not driven by party ideology etc. but
to emphasize that voters attach important weight to the fact whether politicians’
proposals and actions please the electorate or not.
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In order to build the link between political competition and
agricultural protection, it is important to understand in what
circumstances and how winning an election may depend on
the agricultural electorate. In this context, a key issue seems to
be the size of agricultural population. Since the latter strongly
varies between developing and developed countries, it is useful
to keep the distinction between the way through which political
competition affects agricultural protection in these two sets of
countries.
As far as developing countries are concerned, a positive link
between political competition and agricultural protection could
be based on theoretical contributions to two important strands
of the literature. First, it could be motivated by a theoretical
analysis originating from early works by Chicago School rep-
resentatives (see e.g., Becker, 1958; Stigler, 1972). This ap-
proach is based on the analogy between economic and political
competition and argues that political parties cannot defy the
majority wish, just as producers cannot deny consumers the
products they desire, since this would reduce their returns.5
What follows, policy platforms may not neglect the preferences
of the majority as this would mean losing a chance to please a
broad constituency. Consequently, where agricultural popula-
tion constitutes majority, political competition should shorten
the odds on public policies favoring agricultural interests. The
second reason why enhanced political competition is likely to
increase agricultural protection in developing countries could
be supported by a large literature building on the median voter
theorem (Downs, 1957). From this perspective political com-
petition should lead to policies that line up with the median
voter’s preferences. In countries where agricultural population
constitutes the majority it is likely that median income will be
close to agricultural income. According to this logic therefore,
winning an election requires satisfying desires of agricultural
voters. This in turn would result in higher agricultural protec-
tion.
Interestingly, the positive impact of political competition on
agricultural protection can be expected not only in countries
where agricultural electorate accounts for a majority of popula-
tion, but also where agricultural electorate is only marginal. This
reasoning is based on the new generation of political economy
research, which shows that considering consequences of polit-
ical competition tends to be more complex than earlier mod-
els predicted. Important theoretical contributions that model
the (ideological) pork-barrel politics provide insights on in-
centives that politicians have to target narrow groups of high
political clout (e.g., Dixit and Londregan, 1998; Lindbeck and
Weibull, 1987). As shown both theoretically and empirically, in
the presence of high level of political competition parties have
more incentives to appeal to voters from outside their traditional
electorate base. Consequently policy platforms may respond to
desires of relatively small groups of pivotal voters (Besley et al.,
2010; Lizzeri and Persico, 2005). This view suggests then that
5 Note that this does not overrule the fact that public policies may also respond
to desires of minorities (Stigler, 1972).
in the presence of fierce political competition the level of agri-
cultural protection can be high in developed countries, provided
that agricultural electorate, although being marginal, could be
regarded as swing/pivotal voters.
Finally, it is worth noting that political competition may be
expected to increase the level of agricultural protection also
on the grounds of two theories that not necessarily need to
refer to the size of agricultural electorate. First, an interesting
perspective comes out from work focusing on the process of po-
litical turnover and the so-called “replacement effect” (see e.g.,
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2006; Persson et al., 1997).
These studies show that, depending on the risk of losing elec-
tions, political elites may have incentives to adopt socially in-
efficient policies. This may either be driven by the intensified
rent-seeking behavior before being replaced in office or by will-
ingness to make the governing for the opposition harder (e.g., by
increasing the deficit). Given that trade openness is commonly
asserted to be socially optimal (Wacziarg and Welch, 2008),
this line of reasoning offers an additional explanation why one
can observe inefficient policy (agricultural protectionism) to be
pursued in the presence of fierce political competition. Second,
yet another view is put by Persson et al. (2007) who show that
government spending is higher in coalition governments than in
a single-party government. The reason for this is the so-called
“common pool problem” in fiscal policy manifesting itself by
the fact that one party in coalition does not fully internalize the
fiscal costs of spending (see also Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006).
This in turn, positively affects the size of public expenditure.6
This may point to a positive relationship between political com-
petition and government spending, and thus agricultural protec-
tionism, since higher political competition is likely to induce
more fragmented party system and thus a coalition government.
As shown earlier, a positive link between political compe-
tition and agricultural policy could be established on several
grounds. Before moving to verify whether these considerations
find support in the data, it is useful to review the existing ev-
idence. Some insights could be gained from the two recent
studies by Gawande and Hoekman (2010) and Bates and Block
(2010). The picture they paint is mixed, however. Based on a
sample consisting of both developing and developed countries,
Gawande and Hoekman document that higher agricultural pro-
tection is associated with greater electoral competition for the
office of executive. As far as the political competition between
parties is concerned, the results are more ambiguous. Countries
with more comfortable majority of ruling party/coalition (i.e.,
lower political competition) are more likely to subsidize their
exports and less likely to protect their domestic markets against
import. Bates and Block (2010) on the other hand, focusing on
6 Having said that, it should be noted that there is also a substantial literature
arguing that political competition should reduce government spending either
through creation of strict constraints that limit the ability of political elites to
extract rents (see e.g., Becker, 1983; Ferejohn, 1986) or through its negative
effect on public funds devoted to secure and maintain power (Mulligan et al.,
2004).
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Sub-Saharan Africa, find no direct effect of electoral compe-
tition for the office of executive. However, with reference to
Olson’s theory of interest group, they argue that in the presence
of electoral competition the lobbying disadvantage of the rural
majority turns into political advantage.
Some evidence from studies that have identified specific in-
stitutional arrangements crucial for shaping agricultural policy
outcomes is also worth mentioning here. To start with, Swin-
nen et al. (2001) use a long time series data for Belgium and
show that agricultural protection follows only those democratic
reforms that introduce important changes to the distribution
of political power. To illustrate this, the authors show that en-
franchisement of small farmers increased agricultural support.
Although not directly, this evidence may point to a positive
relationship between political competition and agricultural pro-
tection. Second, Olper et al. (2013) document that agricultural
protection increases with transitions to democracy. Given the
focus of our study, it is important to note that elections (and ac-
companying electoral competition) are one of the main political
institution in democratic regimes. Third, Olper and Raimondi
(2011, 2013) uncover this relationship further and show that
the level of protectionism is higher under proportional repre-
sentation as compared to majoritarian electoral rules. This is
of importance especially in the light of political science liter-
ature pointing to a positive relationship between proportional
elections and fragmentation of political system (the so-called
Duverger’s law). Moreover, this result supports earlier findings
pointing to a positive relationship between agricultural protec-
tion and multiparty democracies (Olper, 2001).
While all these studies deepen our understanding of the pro-
cess of agricultural policy formation, they all seem to suggest
that when investigating the effect of democracy on agricul-
tural protection, important insights could be obtained from ex-
ploiting the variation in political structure within democracies.
We believe that having a closer look at the issue of political
competition could complement the existing literature in several
ways. First, by highlighting the role of political competition
we want to contribute to the strand of literature that tries to
unbundle broad cluster of institutions hidden under “democ-
racy.” Second, in contrast to the existing studies (Gawande and
Hoekman, 2010; Olper, 2001), our indicators of competition
between political parties reach beyond the existence of pluralist
party system and ruling party’s seat share in the parliament.
They also extend beyond an index of executive electoral com-
petition used by Gawande and Hoekman (2010) and Bates and
Block (2010) and take advantage of a much larger sample than
most of the existing studies (see Bates and Block, 2010; Olper,
2001). Third, to have more robust evidence on political compe-
tition, we exploit both between- and within-country variation,
which has an advantage over the simple OLS regression models
(Olper, 2001). Importantly, except for using fixed effects re-
gressions we also run General Methods of Moments dynamic
panel models. Fourth, we aim at complementing studies that
document the impact of electoral rules (Olper and Raimondi,
2011, 2013) by adding into perspective issues concerning the
distribution of political power, which might be crucial for pol-
icy outcomes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Swinnen et al.,
2001). Note that this includes the potential fear of replace-
ment coming from challenges from new groups (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006) as well as political representation and bar-
gaining in the legislature (Besley and Case, 2003). We believe
that our measures of the degree of political competition allow
to incorporate these issues into analysis much better than fo-
cusing on binary electoral rules feature. Finally, we also aim
at highlighting whether the impact of political competition is
heterogeneous across countries. To that end, we check how,
if anything, the effect of political competition differs in var-
ious subsamples. Based on the theory presented and earlier
studies pointing to essential differences between agricultural
policies of developed and developing countries, we investigate
whether political competition’s effect differ between low- and
high-income countries. Moreover, we focus on potential differ-
ences between single-party and coalition governments, which
is due to Persson et al. (2007) who document heterogeneous
effect of government structure on the level of public spending.
To best of our knowledge, this article is the first to consider
agricultural protection in this particular context.
3. Data and econometric approach
3.1. Data
We study the effect of political competition on agricultural
protection in an unbalanced panel of 74 countries. We exploit
the variation in political and economic data for the period 1955–
2005. In order to accomplish it, we combine three different
data sources, two data bases of the World Bank: the agricultural
distortions database (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008) and the
Database of Political Institutions 2006 (Beck et al., 2001) as
well as the widely used Polity IV data base (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2005).
As regards our outcome variable, that is, agricultural pro-
tection, we use the nominal rate of assistance (NRA), which
measures the total transfer to agriculture as a percentage of the
undistorted unit value. The NRA is positive when agriculture is
subsidized, negative when it is taxed, and 0 when net transfers
are zero. Note that this variable is much more detailed than the
commonly used trade openness measures either at aggregate
(Wacziarg and Welch, 2008) or sectoral level (Giuliano et al.,
2012). This measure is based on the Agricultural Distortions
data base (see Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008 for details). Ob-
viously, the NRA variable can capture only part of the several
dimensions of agricultural policy. Moreover, as usual with this
kind of variables, it is still an aggregate measure and thus may
suffer from all sorts of problems related to the aggregation pro-
cedure (Aksoy, 2005). While these shortcomings should be kept
in mind when interpreting the results, to best of our knowledge
this is the best measure of agricultural protection available for
so many countries, years, and, perhaps most importantly, policy
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instruments from which the price distortions arise (Anderson
et al., 2009).
Our key explanatory variable is a measure of political com-
petition in a given country. Although there is no commonly
agreed method of measuring political competition most authors
refer to differences in seat or vote shares at last elections (see
Besley and Case, 2003). Accordingly, we follow the existing
empirical research in the way we define it. Our first measure
of political competition focuses on realized political outcomes,
that is, seat shares. It is an index equal to one minus a Herfind-
ahl index calculated as the sum of the squared seat shares of
all parties in the parliament.7 This variable ranges from 0 to
1 with higher values corresponding to higher level of politi-
cal competition and comes from the DPI2006 data base (Beck
et al., 2001). The main advantage of this measure is its avail-
ability for a long time series and a large number of countries
which enables cross-national comparability. One problem with
measures based on electoral results however, is that they might
be jointly determined with (agricultural) policies implemented
as parties may change their policy platforms to attract voters
(Besley and Case, 2003). In order to attenuate this risk we use
an econometric strategy based on fixed effects regressions as
well as GMM dynamic panel models (see later).
We also adopt an alternative empirical approach and define
the level of political competition in accordance with informa-
tion available in the Polity IV data base. This data base provides
insights on how competitive and regulated political participa-
tion is. Specifically, we use the index called polcomp ranging
from 1 to 10, with 1 representing the least amount of political
competitiveness and 10 the most competitiveness. This refers
on the one hand, to the extent to which alternative preferences
for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena
and, on the other hand, to the extent to which there are bind-
ing rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are
expressed (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2005 for details). We nor-
malize this score to a 0–1 scale for greater comparability with
measure based on DPI data set. These two measures of politi-
cal competition are highly correlated, showing a cross-section
correlation in the 1975–2005 equal to 0.62.8 It should be noted
though that due to different rating schemes used for construct-
ing these measures, cross-country comparability across the two
sources is limited.9
7 For other papers that use similar approach, see for example, Skilling and
Zeckhauser (2002) or Persson et al. (2007).
8 Depending on the time period the correlation coefficient ranges from 0.43
to 0.66.
9 Considerable differences between the two measures are especially visible
for countries with polity2 index below zero (i.e., those with weaker democratic
institutions, see Marshall and Jaggers, 2005 for details), such as Morocco or
Senegal, where political competition measured as (1 – Herfindahl index) is
relatively higher than the rating from Polity IV. However, examples of few
interesting discrepancies could also be spotted for some observations for the
United States, Canada, or New Zealand. In these latter cases, we observe high
scores from Polity IV together with relatively low score from DPI2006 (when
elections were dominated by one party). This should be borne in mind when
interpreting the obtained results.
Using Polity IV data set in addition to DPI data has several
advantages. First, it covers a longer time period and thus al-
lows to use more observations. DPI data base covers the period
1975–2005, whereas the Polity IV data base spans 1955–2005.
Consequently, depending on the data set, we work with 1809 or
2732 observations. What is equally important we believe that
these two measures may enable to distinguish between different
shades of political competition. While the DPI measure is based
on the realized political outcomes (and so it reflects the outcome
of last elections), the Polity IV index is likely to capture more
durable rules and norms that shape the process of political par-
ticipation. In this context, the latter measure could be seen as
this shade of political competition, which is an integral feature
of an open access order as defined by North et al. (2009). The
fact that the coefficient of variation in DPI measure is higher
than the coefficient of variation for the Polity IV measure in
71% of countries in our sample supports this assumption. This
characteristic of the Polity IV index is of importance also for
our econometric estimations. Note that the relative stability of
this measure gives some more credence to the fixed effects
specifications which in such circumstances are more likely to
deal with the potential problem of endogeneity. Furthermore, it
should also be noted that political competition measure in the
Polity IV data set, as opposed to that from the DPI data base, is
available not only for democratic countries but also for autoc-
racies. Therefore using this data set allows for greater variation
in political institutions in the sample. This is important not only
for methodological reasons (robustness of results), but also be-
cause institutional details seem to matter for both democratic as
well as nondemocratic regimes (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2008).
Finally, using Polity IV data set enables us to take advantage
of other features of political system such as how competitive
and open the recruitment of chief executives is; and to what ex-
tent the chief executive is constrained institutionally.10 Thanks
to this we can test the robustness of our results to controlling
for these two aspects. This is of importance since the political
economy literature suggests that executive constraints can play
an important role in conflict of interests between policy mak-
ers and citizens and thus the ultimate choice of policies (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Having said that, it should be
noted however, that the Polity IV measure could be criticized
as being subjective and not necessarily well capturing consti-
tutional constraints such as those coming from electoral rules
(Glaeser et al., 2004). While this should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results, we are not aware of any better political
competition measure that would be available for such a number
of countries/years.
As discussed by de Gorter and Swinnen (2002) or Swin-
nen (2010), there is an extensive literature, both theoretical and
empirical, showing that agricultural policy may importantly de-
pend on structural factors and resource endowments. Therefore,
10 These variables take values from 1 to 7 and from 1 to 8, respectively.
The latter one corresponds to the procedural rules constraining state actions
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).
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Table 1
Agricultural protection and political competition
NRA
N Mean SD
Distribution of political competition measure
Polity IV measure
First quartile 683 −19.51 29.13
Second quartile 683 −7.67 26.74
Third quartile 683 31.86 68.09
Fourth quartile 683 76.36 90.55
DPI measure
First quartile 452 −15.76 32.09
Second quartile 452 11.12 42.91
Third quartile 452 44.68 66.34
Fourth quartile 453 49.54 83.27
Note: Own calculations.
throughout our analysis we control also for a number of vari-
ables capturing various socioeconomic aspects such as: GDP
per capita, size of population, agricultural land per capita, and
employment share of agriculture, all of which enter our regres-
sions in logs. All these data come from the World Development
Indicators data base, FAO sources, and national statistics. As
a check, we also investigate whether our results are robust to
the usage of additional covariates trying to account for gen-
eral development in trade policy and various policy shocks.11
To capture the former, we use trade to GDP ratio (from the
Penn World Table) and an updated Sachs–Warner index of the
openness (Wacziarg and Welch, 2008). To account for policy
turbulences that may affect the level of agricultural prices we
use two dummies: a dummy indicating the incidence of nega-
tive growth rate (based on the Penn World Table) and a dummy
indicating whether a given country is involved in international
conflict (based on the UCD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Ver-
sion 4–2008; Gleditsch et al., 2002). These two variables aim to
capture the effect of economic and political crises, respectively.
In some specifications we also use a variable capturing (log of)
government expenditures (based on the Penn World Table) to
control for the fact that agricultural support may be correlated
with the general level of government spending.
Some basic associations between the main variables of in-
terest are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 and Figs. 1a and b. Ta-
ble 1 provides information on agricultural protectionism across
subsequent quartiles of distributions of political competition
measures. As indicated, the preliminary evidence tends to sug-
gest that there is a positive correlation between political com-
petition and agricultural protection. Further insights could be
derived from Table 2 and Figs. 1a and b. The former reports
descriptive statistics for all main variables used in the analysis.
The statistics provided pertain to simple cross-sectional aver-
ages over the analyzed period. Figures 1a and b, on the other
hand, presents the pattern of political competition measured as
the average of political competition index from the Polity IV
(DPI2006) data base in every five years intervals between 1955
11 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this to us.
and 2005 (1975 and 2005). The reported statistics as well as
the patterns depicted in graphs suggest that political competi-
tion varies quite considerably both in time and across different
institutional environments as captured by various subsamples.
This in turn, may indicate that exploiting variation in political
competition could add some new insights to the correlation be-
tween different institutional aspects and agricultural protection
found in other articles. The next section presents econometric
tools that we use to examine these issues.
3.2. Econometric approach
The main problem we face is that both public policy and polit-
ical competition may be determined endogenously. Therefore,
investigating causal relationship between political competition
and the level of protectionism requires controlling for common
variables affecting both of these phenomena. The easiest way
to, at least partly, solve this problem is to control for country
and time fixed effects. This allows to take out the effect of time
invariant (potentially historical) factors and time effects, respec-
tively, that are likely to capture country differences responsible
for both policy and political institutions.
Accordingly, to examine the interplay of political competi-
tion and the level of agricultural protection we estimate regres-
sions of the form
yit = βzit + ϑxit + δi + ϕt + εit ,
where yit represents the NRA to agriculture in country i at time t;
zit is our key regressor of interest, that is, our measure of political
competition. As mentioned earlier, we consider two different
measures for it, namely an index based on market concentra-
tion index applied to party politics (DPI measure) and an index
characterizing regulation and competitiveness of political par-
ticipation (Polity IV measure); xit is a vector of covariates and
δi and ϕt are country and year fixed effects, respectively. Most
importantly, vector xit controls for other characteristics of polit-
ical institutions, namely constraints imposed on the executive as
well as the competitiveness and openness of executive recruit-
ment. We define them as component variables exconst and exrec
in Polity IV data base, respectively (for details see Marshall and
Jaggers, 2005).12 This is done in order to see whether the effect
of political competition is robust to controlling for other polit-
ical institutions. Moreover, this may provide some insights on
relative importance of different institutional arrangements. In
addition, in order to control the traditional influences on agri-
cultural protection we follow the existing studies and vector xit
includes also income per capita, total population, employment
12 The Polity IV data base includes also other more disaggregated political
institutions’ variables labelled “component variables” (Marshall and Jaggers,
2005). However, as shown by Treier and Jackman (2008) the coding and values
of these variables depend on each other. Including them in regression as inde-
pendent variables in turn, is likely to increase the risk of inferential error. In
contrary, the so-called “concept variables” that we use, that is, polcomp, exrec,
and exconst can be considered conditionally independent.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean SD Min Max Obs. Mean SD Min Max Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Full sample OECD Non-OECD
NRA 2,732 20.25 70.76 −93.11 455.19 896 68.61 87.54 −41.46 444.99 1,700 −6.68 35.44 −93.11 217.67
Political competition—Polity IV 2,732 0.60 0.40 0 1 896 0.94 0.19 0 1 1,700 0.41 0.36 0 1
Political competition—DPI2006 1,773 0.52 0.26 0 0.92 643 0.66 0.11 0 0.85 1,130 0.45 0.30 0 0.92
Executive recruitment 2,732 6.36 2.16 1 8 896 7.84 0.78 3 8 1,700 5.56 2.25 1 8
Executive constraints 2,732 4.83 2.31 1 7 896 6.64 1.19 1 7 1,700 3.84 2.15 1 7
Log of GDP per capita 2,626 7.63 1.69 4.44 10.59 889 9.54 0.65 7.35 10.59 1,700 6.63 1.12 4.44 9.59
Log of total population 2,537 9.89 1.28 7.18 14.09 870 9.80 1.23 7.94 12.60 1,666 9.93 1.30 7.18 14.09
Log of agricultural land per capita 2,537 1.88 4.41 0.03 43.96 870 2.44 7.05 0.03 43.96 1,666 1.58 1.88 0.37 12.95
Employment share of agricultural sector 2,537 39.46 29.22 1.48 92.64 870 12.64 13.38 1.65 77.97 1,666 53.46 25.20 1.48 92.64
Coalition government Single-party government
NRA 759 42.86 77.96 −65.71 427.90 930 6.97 49.46 −93.11 226.43
Political competition—Polity IV 759 0.80 0.28 0 1 930 0.54 0.40 0 1
Political competition—DPI2006 759 0.68 0.15 0.10 0.92 924 0.37 0.26 0 0.92
Executive recruitment 759 7.25 1.66 2 8 930 5.95 2.26 3 8
Executive constraints 759 5.89 1.66 1 7 930 4.56 2.18 1 7
Log of GDP per capita 759 8.27 1.67 4.50 10.59 930 7.43 1.66 4.54 10.52
Log of total population 724 9.81 1.24 7.18 13.76 907 10.14 1.35 7.22 14.09
Log of agricultural land per capita 724 1.46 4.19 0.03 34.65 907 1.76 3.48 0.03 30.71
Employment share of agricultural sector 724 26.82 26.12 1.48 92.27 907 42.13 29.22 1.65 92.21
Note: Simple averages. Observations pooled across countries and years. The maximum value for the full sample is different than that observed for the OECD/non-
OECD subsamples as this value was observed before 1961 (in Switzerland), that is, before the OECD has been established.
share of agricultural sector, and agricultural land per capita (all
in logs).
To check whether our results are not driven by observations
for countries with high level of taxes on agricultural activi-
ties, we investigate whether our findings are robust to dropping
countries or observations with nominal rate of protection be-
low the first or fifth percentile value of NRA, depending on the
specification.
As a further robustness check we experiment not only with
annual panel but also with average rate of assistance over each
legislative period. In addition, we construct also a panel, for
which we take observation every election year.13 In order to
correct the standard errors for potential correlation across ob-
servations both over time and within the same time period,
all standard errors in the article are robust against arbitrary
heteroskedasticity in the variance–covariance matrix, and they
allow for clustering at the country level (Bertrand et al., 2004).
A potential concern with fixed effects estimations is that they
take out only time-invariant unobservable factors. Endogeneity
problem instead may be caused (also) by unobservable factors
that vary over time. Therefore, with fixed effects regressions
we may not necessarily estimate the casual effect of political
competition on agricultural policy in the presence of time vary-
ing omitted variables. To deal with this issue we consider an
alternative strategy and use the Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) estimator and estimate dynamic panel models
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This
is done for two main reasons. First, agricultural support may
13 This is done in order to overcome potential biases due to serial correlation
introduced by averaging.
exhibit strong persistence over time and thus dynamic mod-
els may be preferable to static ones. In such situation, GMM
estimators are preferable to fixed effects estimates as the lat-
ter are not consistent (Wooldridge, 2002). Second, and perhaps
more importantly, GMM models allow to endogenize political
competition by building the set of instruments from past obser-
vations of the instrumented variable. To check whether we find
broadly similar results using alternative models, we use both
first-difference and system GMM estimators.14 As GMM dy-
namic panel models often suffer from the so-called “instrument
proliferation bias” (see e.g., Roodman, 2009a) we also test the
robustness of our findings to reducing the set of instruments.
As argued by Angrist and Pischke (2008), combining fixed
effects models and dynamic panel models has an additional ad-
vantage since estimates from these two models could be treated
as bounding the causal effect of interest. Therefore, while our
models may fail to fully cope with endogeneity problems, we
believe that they at least provide the range within which the true
effect of political competition on agricultural protection should
lie.
Finally, as already mentioned, based on various panel data
estimations, we also check how, if anything, the influence of
14 Before running System GMM we also check whether our key variables
of interest (i.e., dependent variable and two political competition measures)
are stationary. We do so using Im-Pesaran-Shin (Im et al., 2003) and Fisher-
type (Choi, 2001) tests. These tests have been chosen as they fit our data
characteristics and can be applied to unbalanced panels and panels with gaps,
respectively. All the tests that we performed allow to firmly reject the null
hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root in favor of the alternative that
some series represent stationary processes. We thank an anonymous referee for
suggesting this to us.
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Fig. 1. (a) Political competition (Polity IV measure) over years and income levels. (b) Political competition (DPI2006 measure) over years and income levels.
political competition differs in various subsamples defined ac-
cording to the structure of government (coalition vs. single-
party) and the level of income (OECD vs. non-OECD).
This investigation builds on findings by Persson et al.
(2007) and statistics reported in Table 2. Based on that,
it could be argued, for instance, that the political competi-
tion may exert particular pressure in countries with coali-
tion rather than single-party governments since the voters
can discriminate between the coalition parties at the polls.
On the other hand, it could be argued that low-income coun-
tries are characterized by more political instability and that
election outcomes have smaller influence on policies than
the more durable institutions determining the competitive-
ness of political system in general, regardless of election
results.
4. Results
Table 3 displays the results of our fixed-effects regressions
where we use annual data.15 The left panel refers to political
15 We report here fixed effects rather than random effects estimates following
Hausman specification tests that allow to reject (at 1% level) the hypothesis that
our specification should be modeled by a random effects model. For example,
as regards the models presented in Table 3, the relevant Hausman test statistics
range between <123.50; 140.62> depending on the specification.
J. Fałkowski, A. Olper/ Agricultural Economics 00 (2013) 1–16 9
Table 3
Fixed effects regressions—full sample, annual data
Dependent var.: NRA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Polity IV measure of political competition DPI2006 measure of political competition
Political competition 30.22*** 28.78*** 33.55*** 32.59*** 34.14*** 26.53*** 17.40* 16.52*
(9.13) (6.13) (8.14) (7.94) (10.5) (9.30) (8.78) (8.66)
Log GDP per capita 49.59*** 49.92*** 50.46*** 52.36*** 48.71*** 51.43***
(12.7) (12.9) (11.5) (14.7) (13.1) (12.8)
Log population 71.74* 72.32* 54.53 108.6** 106.0** 90.46**
(40.5) (40.7) (37.6) (42.1) (41.7) (42.7)
Log land per capita −4.616 −2.626 −15.10 −16.48 −7.584 −18.01
(28.7) (30.2) (28.9) (35.2) (37.2) (39.0)
Log share of Agr. Empl. −17.21 −17.78 −20.84 −24.74 −25.50 −29.42**
(14.5) (14.4) (14.0) (17.5) (15.4) (13.8)
Executive recruitment 0.248 −0.0722 3.403* 3.317*
(1.63) (1.53) (1.85) (1.86)
Executive constraint −1.277 −1.104 0.521 0.733
(1.94) (1.79) (1.77) (1.86)
Sachs–Warner dummy 19.69*** 12.88**
(4.44) (5.01)
Log openness 0.509 1.581
(5.47) (6.47)
Log govt. consumption −6.023 3.065
(7.54) (7.84)
Economic crisis −0.523 0.141
(1.58) (1.80)
Political crisis 4.362 1.586
(3.98) (4.95)
Constant −31.34 −964.4** −967.7** −764.0** 4.544 −1462*** −1420*** −1308***
(19.0) (389) (390) (356) (7.54) (447) (434) (441)
Observations 2732 2530 2530 2468 1809 1748 1714 1666
Number of countries 74 74 74 72 74 74 74 72
R-squared within 0.13 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.25
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include time fixed effects as additional explanatory variables; robust standard errors clustered by country
in parentheses.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
competition measure based on Polity IV data base, whereas the
right one reports estimations for DPI measure. We start with
basic specifications in columns (1) and (5). For both political
competition measures the estimated coefficients are highly sig-
nificant and positive suggesting that more intense political com-
petition leads to higher agricultural protection. This result holds
also in number of specifications with additional control vari-
ables including structural factors, resource endowments, and
other institutional variables (columns 2, 3, 6, and 7). Impor-
tantly, the impact of political competition seems to dominate
the role of constraints imposed on the executive or openness of
executive recruitment (see columns (3) and (4). Note that the
former variable is concerned with the checks and balances on
a leader, whereas the latter one informs how competitive and
open the recruitment of chief executive is. These results seem to
complement earlier findings of Gawande and Hoeckman (2010)
and Bates and Block (2010) who find a positive relationship of
agricultural protection and electoral competition for the office
of executive. It should also be noted that our results are consis-
tent with previous findings showing that agricultural policy is
positively correlated with the level of income, and negatively
with both agricultural land per capita and the employment share
of agriculture (e.g., Olper, 2001; 2007). In columns (4) and (8)
we further check the robustness of our results to inclusion of
variables trying to account for developments in trade policy in
general as well as for various policy shocks.16 Importantly, our
findings remain unaffected.
One could argue that changes in political competition are
mostly due to general developments under democracies, which
could determine agricultural policy choices as showed by Olper
et al. (2013). To take this concern into account, we estimate
additional specifications (not reported here) in which we in-
clude interaction terms between time dummies and a democracy
dummy. The latter is based on the Polity 2 score, measuring the
degree of democracy (see Marshall and Jaggers 2005, for de-
tails).17 Our results are robust to such inclusion. This suggests
that the impact of political competition remains fairly the same
regardless of the fact whether we exploit variation in the full
sample or only within democracies.
16 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this to us.
17 Following the literature, we create a discrete cut-off between democracies
and autocracies with democracies being those with positive Polity2 score.
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Table 4
Fixed effects regressions—restricted sample (without observations/countries with high taxes on agricultural activities)
Dependent variable: NRA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITY IV DPI POLITY IV DPI POLITY IV DPI POLITY IV DPI
measure measure measure measure measure measure measure measure
Political comp. 31.16*** 15.68* 30.77*** 16.17* 30.92*** 21.20** 26.29*** 22.05*
(7.78) (8.65) (8.04) (8.90) (8.91) (10.2) (9.71) (11.9)
Log GDP per cap. 48.98*** 50.38*** 46.73*** 50.87*** 52.45*** 51.89*** 63.18*** 59.87***
(11.5) (13.1) (12.0) (13.8) (12.3) (13.6) (15.2) (17.0)
Log population 56.90 93.53** 56.67 89.83** 50.28 78.98* 54.36 70.45
(37.6) (43.0) (37.5) (43.3) (37.8) (45.7) (40.0) (46.9)
Log land per cap. −14.25 −18.61 −14.55 −19.24 −15.73 −21.90 −4.316 −0.448
(28.7) (38.6) (28.5) (38.9) (31.1) (44.1) (34.6) (49.3)
Log share Agr emp −22.05 −32.22** −24.64* −37.58*** −26.17* −38.54*** −33.29** −45.55***
(13.9) (13.5) (14.0) (13.0) (14.1) (13.0) (15.3) (12.3)
Executive recruit. −0.373 2.980* −0.804 2.370 −0.536 3.456* 0.704 5.155**
(1.43) (1.61) (1.44) (1.58) (1.57) (1.96) (1.68) (2.47)
Executive constr. −0.928 0.733 −0.644 0.993 −0.759 0.425 −2.005 −1.216
(1.68) (1.68) (1.69) (1.69) (1.77) (1.89) (1.73) (2.11)
Sachs–Warner 18.77*** 11.66** 17.80*** 11.81** 21.64*** 13.72** 25.96*** 19.29***
(4.42) (4.92) (4.46) (5.09) (4.80) (5.57) (5.86) (6.73)
Log openness 0.824 2.131 1.851 3.850 −0.267 3.718 7.653 4.003
(5.63) (6.59) (6.25) (7.03) (6.60) (7.18) (8.96) (11.5)
Log govt. cons. −8.590 −0.149 −9.349 −1.369 −9.202 −0.0136 −4.094 7.145
(7.54) (7.21) (8.19) (7.95) (9.39) (9.25) (10.7) (10.8)
Constant −765.2** −1315*** −741.0** −1275*** −720.9* −1206** −1062** −1208**
(356) (445) (359) (451) (365) (470) (453) (495)
Observations 2442 1649 2339 1584 2201 1491 1856 1255
No. of countries 72 72 72 72 64 64 55 55
R-squared 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.28
Note: All regressions include time fixed effects as additional explanatory variables; robust standard errors clustered by country. Columns (1) and (2) exclude
observations for which NRA is smaller than the first percentile. Columns (3) and (4) exclude observations for which NRA is smaller than the fifth percentile. Columns
(5) and (6) exclude countries for which NRA was smaller than first percentile in at least one year. Columns (7) and (8) exclude countries for which NRA was smaller
than fifth percentile in at least one year.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
In Table 4 we investigate whether our results hold if we
drop from the sample observations/countries with high taxes
on agricultural activities.18 Regardless of the fact whether we
drop observations/countries below the first or fifth percentile
of NRA, political competition exerts a positive and statistically
significant effect on agricultural protection.
Tables 5 and 6 further check the robustness of our analysis
based on fixed effects models using as a dependent variable
NRA but only in a elections’ year panel and an average NRA
to agriculture in interelection years, respectively. In general,
both these exercises strengthen our earlier findings and point to
a positive association between political competition and agri-
cultural protection. What should be noted though, is that the
evidence on the DPI measure of political competition in these
additional regressions, although still positive, is slightly above
the conventional statistical significance level.
We now move to present our findings based on GMM dy-
namic panel models. As mentioned earlier, they allow to endo-
genize political competition using lags as instruments and thus
attenuate potential concerns with fixed effects specifications.
The relevant results are reported in Tables 7 (Polity IV measure
18 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this to us.
of political competition) and 8 (DPI measure of political com-
petition). We show models based on both first-difference GMM
and system GMM estimators. What is important, we test the
robustness of our findings to reducing number of instruments.
While it is unclear how small should the set of instruments
be, the rule of thumb is that it should not exceed the number
of groups (Roodman, 2009b). As shown in Table 7, when we
use Polity IV measure of political competition our results are
very robust across various specifications19 and confirm earlier
findings based on fixed effects models. More specifically, polit-
ical competition exerts a positive effect on agricultural protec-
tion. This holds also when we additionally treat as endogenous
the (log of) share of agricultural employment (columns 5 and
10).20 Further, as expected and consistent with other studies, the
19 For all GMM models we report Hansen statistics (P values) and for system-
GMM regressions we also report Difference in Hansen statistics (P values). In
general, small P values suggest that instruments used are not valid. P values
equal to (almost) one however should also be treated as problematic as they are
likely result from the “instrument proliferation” problem (Roodman, 2009a).
While the models presented in columns (1) and (6) in Table 7 (columns 1 and
4 in Table 8) are likely to suffer from instrument proliferation problem, the
diagnostics for the other specifications are much more reassuring.
20 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this to us.
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Table 5
Political competition and agricultural protection—parliamentary election years subsample, dependent variable—NRA from the year that elections were held, fixed
effects regressions
Polity IV measure of political competition DPI2006 measure of political competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Political competition 27.98*** 24.60** 27.72* 30.09** 34.73*** 20.99** 18.00* 15.19
(10.3) (10.4) (15.9) (13.7) (9.38) (10.2) (10.5) (9.34)
Log GDP per capita 36.27*** 37.30*** 43.29*** 31.92** 33.57** 37.53***
(12.9) (12.7) (12.2) (13.8) (13.2) (12.4)
Log population 72.48** 73.27** 64.92* 78.12** 79.64** 68.91
(34.3) (34.8) (38.2) (37.9) (38.0) (42.8)
Log land per capita 15.35 17.71 4.166 8.120 9.151 4.298
(44.5) (44.7) (46.0) (50.6) (50.6) (53.4)
Log share of agr empl. −0.785 −1.022 −5.003 4.016 −0.856 −1.023
(18.2) (17.6) (15.8) (18.1) (17.2) (16.0)
Executive recruitment 1.772 1.752 1.432 0.906
(2.19) (2.11) (2.45) (2.26)
Executive constraint −2.446 −2.707 0.471 0.745
(2.80) (2.97) (1.98) (2.34)
Sachs–Warner dummy 15.04** 17.07***
(5.97) (6.23)
Log openness 10.64 11.70
(7.07) (8.18)
Economic crisis 8.001*** 10.10***
(2.77) (3.21)
Political crisis 2.427 −4.112
(6.54) (8.50)
Log govt. consumption 15.39* 17.60
(8.65) (11.0)
Constant −5.002 −999.4*** −1015*** −1051*** 2.420 −1010** −1052** −1130**
(13.2) (344) (350) (388) (4.91) (399) (400) (461)
Observations 465 451 451 440 427 412 408 398
Number of countries 73 73 73 71 73 73 73 71
R-squared 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.36
Note: All regressions include time fixed effects as additional explanatory variables; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
coefficient by lagged dependent variable is statistically signifi-
cant showing that agricultural policy is strongly persistent over
time. The results for the DPI measure of political competition
are also in line with these findings but slightly less robust (see
Table 8). Given the nature of this variable, except for the results
based on annual sample, we report the results based on the sam-
ple restricted to years with parliamentary elections. This is done
because the DPI variable is based on election outcomes and so
it does not vary between elections. This, in turn, may affect
the results from GMM models based on annual sample since
they are based on first-differencing. In these additional specifi-
cations the effect of political competition is always positive but
less robust than in previous regressions.
Finally, we investigate whether the effects of political compe-
tition are heterogeneous across countries (Table 9). According
to the data displayed in Table 2 this may indeed take place.
Moreover, the patterns depicted in Figs. 1a and b seem to sug-
gest that there is considerable difference in variation in political
competition between OECD and non-OECD countries. While
looking at changes in political competition scores in these two
groups of countries one may assume that in the OECD sub-
sample agricultural policy might be driven especially by the
variation in political competition measured as “1 – Herfind-
ahl index.” The Polity IV political competition score in this
group on the other hand remains fairly stable. As far as the
non-OECD sample is concerned, the visual inspection of the
graph suggests that while both political competition measures
vary substantially, changes in the Polity IV measure might be
more influential. Table 9 reports basic regressions that aim at
highlighting these issues (columns 1–4).21 The obtained results
cautiously confirm the above-mentioned suppositions. The co-
efficient on DPI political competition in the OECD subsample
is positive (moreover it increases in magnitude as compared to
our full sample estimates, see column 6 in Table 3) but is just
below the 10% significance level. The coefficient on Polity IV
measure on the other hand is smaller and not distinguishable
from zero. Taking into account that DPI measure is based on the
concentration index applied to party politics, this tends to in-
dicate that in developed countries agricultural policy responds
21 Here we rely only on fixed effects estimates as the number of groups for
each subsample is relatively small (compared to number of time periods) and
all the GMM models that we tried suffer from the “instrument proliferation
problem” and thus they are hardly reliable.
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Table 6
Political competition and agricultural protection—parliamentary election years subsample; dependent variable—average NRA in inter-election years, fixed effects
regressions
Polity IV measure of political competition DPI2006 measure of political competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Political competition 31.09*** 27.80*** 25.42** 27.37** 29.20*** 13.07 9.849 7.820
(8.50) (8.51) (11.9) (10.6) (7.84) (8.43) (8.39) (7.94)
Log GDP per capita 27.71** 27.83** 33.51*** 21.83* 23.16** 26.95***
(11.3) (10.9) (10.5) (11.2) (10.2) (9.64)
Log population 71.28** 71.41** 62.72** 89.77*** 85.46*** 79.14**
(27.1) (27.3) (28.5) (31.5) (30.0) (31.9)
Log land per capita 19.19 21.03 8.983 13.86 16.62 14.70
(34.4) (34.4) (36.3) (38.9) (37.6) (38.8)
Log share of agr empl. −4.784 −4.862 −7.348 1.098 −3.844 −3.333
(14.3) (13.8) (12.8) (14.3) (13.2) (12.6)
Executive recruitment 2.016 1.644 1.091 0.395
(1.55) (1.63) (1.63) (1.64)
Executive constraint −1.325 −1.024 2.491 3.190*
(2.20) (2.28) (1.71) (1.90)
Sachs–Warner dummy 13.22*** 14.13***
(4.70) (5.11)
Log openness 7.961 12.71*
(5.53) (6.81)
Economic crisis 7.147** 8.919***
(2.82) (3.13)
Political crisis 4.010 −0.557
(4.72) (5.82)
Log govt. consumption 3.887 8.776
(7.66) (9.47)
Constant −6.099 −923.9*** −928.9*** −945.8*** 22.81*** −1068*** −1045*** −1101***
(8.18) (273) (274) (288) (4.56) (322) (302) (325)
Observations 486 452 452 441 448 413 410 400
Number of countries 73 73 73 71 73 73 73 71
R-squared 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.33
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions include time fixed effects as additional explanatory variables.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
predominantly to electoral competition and not to more general
rules determining political organization of the society. Given
that the share of agricultural electorate in total electorate in
these countries is rather marginal, this result is consistent with
theoretical predictions that policy is targeted at swing voters.22
As far as developing countries are concerned on the other hand,
it seems that there agricultural policy is shaped predominantly
by improvements in more durable rules that determine politi-
cal participation and political competition. Taking into account
that in these countries agricultural electorate constitutes abso-
lute majority, the evidence provided tends to indicate that there
a median voter model could find some support.
In the next columns we distinguish between countries with
coalition and single-party government. Persson et al. (2007)
develop a theoretical model and document that coalition gov-
ernments tend to spend more than single-party ones. Data pro-
vided in Table 2 seem to confirm these findings showing that
agricultural protection is higher in countries with coalitions
22 In our sample the median (mean) employment share of agriculture in OECD
countries is roughly 8% (13%), whereas in non-OECD countries it is roughly
58% (54%).
government. It is interesting therefore to note that electoral
competition may matter not only when there is a coalition gov-
ernment (column 8) but also in the scenario with a single-party
government (column 7). This means that electoral competi-
tion affects decisions regarding agricultural policy both inside
the coalition governments as well as in the scenario where
the political stage is divided between single-party government
and opposition. This, in turn, gives some support to the idea
that electoral competition is at work regardless of the fact that
coalition governments are associated with higher spending and
provides an independent determinant of agricultural protection.
The impact of political competition defined as an index of polit-
ical competitiveness (Polity IV measure) is slightly less robust
(see columns 5 and 6).
5. Conclusions
In recent years political economy literature has been trying
to deepen our understanding of the interplay of political insti-
tutions and policy choices. Aiming to contribute to this strand
of the literature, in this article we investigate the relationship
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Table 7
GMM regression—Polity IV measure of political competition
Dependent var.: NRA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
One-step first difference GMM Two-step system GMM
Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed
full lag lag third- lag full lag lag third- lag
instruments structure structure lag structure instruments structure structure lag structure
(3, 16) (3, 7) instruments (3, 8) (3, 13) (3, 10) instruments (3, 7)
Political competition 13.34*** 5.229** 4.768** 4.283** 8.567* 15.17*** 9.808*** 9.190*** 8.905*** 9.660***
(2.82) (2.18) (2.10) (2.06) (4.87) (4.35) (2.57) (2.85) (2.05) (2.53)
Lagged NRA 0.818*** 0.932*** 0.953*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.803*** 0.939*** 0.940*** 0.981*** 0.940***
(0.023) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.039) (0.049) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.040)
Log GDP per cap. 12.64*** 6.928*** 5.897*** 5.301*** −3.563 11.35 0.813 0.779 0.215 0.199
(2.58) (1.76) (1.66) (1.64) (6.07) (8.72) (0.80) (0.76) (0.75) (2.16)
Log population 20.16*** 13.88*** 12.45*** 11.68*** 40.60*** 1.129 0.0376 0.0245 0.0889 −0.0435
(7.40) (4.43) (4.00) (3.81) (12.9) (2.03) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.41)
Log land per cap. 1.653 1.654 1.819 1.878 5.897 −2.134** −0.905 −0.881 −0.505 −1.024*
(7.65) (4.90) (4.39) (4.17) (7.71) (0.89) (0.57) (0.59) (0.63) (0.61)
Log share of agr empl. 0.163 1.995 2.429 2.657* −33.07** 15.95 2.295*** 2.064** 2.476*** 1.117
(2.76) (1.61) (1.49) (1.43) (14.1) (12.7) (0.88) (0.90) (0.68) (3.04)
Constant −154.2 −19.84** −18.43** −14.55** −10.03
(124) (8.73) (8.54) (6.29) (24.1)
Observations 2383 2383 2383 2383 2383 2489 2489 2489 2489 2489
No. of countries 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
No. of instruments 140 76 58 50 65 143 73 67 53 66
Test for AR3 (P value) 0.127 0.122 0.121 0.120 0.106 0.0890 0.123 0.126 0.120 0.132
Hansen stat. (P value) 1.000 0.279 0.289 Exactly 0.492 1.000 0.140 0.0678 0.564 0.170
identified
Difference Hansen test (P value) . . . . 1.000 0.799 0.216 0.564 0.218
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country (incorporating Windmeijer correction) in parentheses. All regressions include time fixed effects as additional
explanatory variables; columns (5) and (10) report the results for specifications where we also endogenize log of employment share in agriculture.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
between political competition and agricultural policy. In order
to achieve it, we exploit variation in political and economic
data from 74 countries for the post-war period. To address po-
tential problem of endogeneity we use both fixed effects as
well as GMM dynamic panel models. To proxy political com-
petition we use two measures, one that captures more general
rules that determine political participation and one that is based
on vote share at last parliamentary elections. Our results show
that political competition positively affects the level of agricul-
tural protection. In general, these findings hold across differ-
ent specifications and estimation techniques, as well as across
different political competition proxies, although for the mea-
sure based on election outcomes, the results are somewhat less
robust.
With this caveat in mind, it can be noted that our findings
are in line with empirical and theoretical contributions to the
political economy literature pointing to a positive association
between political competition and government spending. While
they hold for various subsamples, some heterogeneity with re-
spect to these effects could be observed. In developing countries
it is mainly a consequence of improvements in more durable
rules that affect political competition and participation. In de-
veloped countries, on the other hand, electoral competition
seems to be more important. This points toward hypothesis
that agricultural policy could be explained by swing voters and
median voter models in developed and developing countries,
respectively.
We also provide some evidence that political competition
importantly complements other institutional aspects in deter-
mining public policy. First, we find that it seems to dominate
the impact of constraints imposed on the executive. Second,
we document that political competition matters both in scenar-
ios with coalition governments as well as in scenarios where
the political stage is divided between single-party government
and opposition. This is important, since it indicates that polit-
ical competition may affect the policy outcomes, regardless of
the fact that coalition governments are associated with higher
spending.
The obtained results have also some implications for further
research. First, collating our results with findings by Besley et al.
(2010), who document positive relationship between political
competition and growth-promoting policies, rises an important
question concerning the relationship between agricultural pro-
tection and growth.
Further, it is important to note that changes in agricultural
protection, in whatever direction, mask subtle but important
changes between taxation and subsidization. From this point of
view a promising field of research could be to verify the hy-
pothesis originating from Becker (1983) on the relationship
between political competition, (agricultural) protection, and
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Table 8
GMM regressions—DPI2006 measure of political competition
Dependent var.: NRA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Two-step GMM Two-step GMM First-difference GMM
Annual sample Parliamentary elections’ years subsample
Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed
full lag lag full lag lag lag lag lag lag lag
instruments structure structure instruments structure structure structure structure structure structure structure
(3, 18) (3, 12) (3, 16) (3, 10) (3, 8) (3, 10) (3, 10) (3, 5) (3, 8)
Political competition 24.67** 10.33* 10.28* 21.11 26.29** 25.62* 16.68 21.42* 45.28* 35.40 10.16
(9.79) (6.25) (5.71) (13.4) (12.3) (13.2) (14.3) (12.5) (24.6) (31.4) (21.0)
Lagged NRA 0.752*** 0.882*** 0.902*** 0.836*** 0.922*** 0.911*** 0.908*** 0.927*** 0.831*** 0.890** 0.786***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.053) (0.15) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.38) (0.19)
Log GDP per capita 3.335 1.281 1.309 2.875 −0.136 0.320 1.316 −9.296 2.754 7.035 9.671
(4.90) (1.03) (2.87) (7.96) (2.47) (3.94) (3.81) (10.9) (10.1) (17.0) (8.67)
Log population −1.599 −0.519 −0.478 −0.799 −0.397 −0.575 −0.751 −1.395 −53.71 −31.88 49.59
(1.06) (0.34) (0.40) (2.03) (0.64) (0.96) (0.98) (1.92) (49.0) (66.1) (40.8)
Log land per capita −4.433*** −1.977** −1.893 −2.030 −0.0164 −0.726 −1.221 −1.375 −28.11 −10.25 −28.73
(1.24) (0.83) (1.19) (3.86) (2.36) (4.00) (3.82) (3.19) (44.3) (42.8) (40.7)
Log share of agr. empl. 1.152 0.638 1.160 2.290 0.545 0.108 0.579 −15.16 27.51 16.97 −18.06
(6.64) (1.40) (3.87) (10.9) (2.27) (2.38) (2.17) (17.4) (18.3) (24.8) (48.8)
Constant −24.15 −11.25 −13.83 −30.65 −13.41 −11.90 −13.86 118.2
(64.8) (13.2) (32.3) (102) (22.8) (27.8) (26.5) (144)
Observations 1735 1735 1735 407 407 407 407 407 400 400 400
No. of countries 74 74 74 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73
No. of instruments 108 68 66 108 64 52 48 60 49 39 50
test for AR3 (P value) 0.231 0.239 0.238 0.207 0.208 0.224 0.227 0.246 0.297 0.362 0.305
Hansen test (P value) 0.996 0.165 0.252 0.999 0.689 0.519 0.383 0.569 0.585 0.446 0.554
Difference Hansen test (P value) 1.000 0.542 0.784 0.552 0.407 0.137 0.229 0.413 – – –
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country (incorporating Windmeijer correction) in parentheses. All regressions include time fixed effects as additional
explanatory variables; columns (3), (8), and (11) report the results from specifications here we also endogenize log of employment share in agriculture.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
Table 9
Fixed effects estimates of political competition specification for various subsamples
Dependent variable—nominal (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rate of assistance (NRA). Polity IV political DPI2006 political Polity IV political DPI2006 political
competition competition competition competition
OECD Non-OECD OECD Non-OECD Single-party govt. Coalition govt. Single-party govt. Coalition govt.
Political competition 10.01 17.19*** 44.50 10.05 37.08*** 17.06 35.52*** 34.24**
(19.6) (5.99) (34.2) (7.01) (8.03) (14.3) (12.3) (16.8)
Observations 863 1666 617 1097 907 724 901 737
Number of countries 26 58 26 55 65 63 65 63
R-squared 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.40 0.27 0.37 0.28
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include log of GDP per capita, log of population, log of agricultural land per capita, log of employment share
of agriculture, and time fixed effects as additional explanatory variables; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
deadweight cost of taxation/subsidization. Note that, in gen-
eral, in developed countries agriculture is subsidized whereas in
developing countries it is taxed. From this perspective, interest-
ing insights could be provided by theoretical predictions made
by Aidt (2003). According to this study, distributive programs
that are inefficient are unlikely to be contested, which may
explain that we do not observe reductions in agricultural pro-
tection in developed countries. On the other hand, in developing
countries agricultural policy may be perceived as an inefficient
source of taxes which in turn implies that political competition
should increase agricultural protection (decrease agricultural
taxation). Other areas which seem to be worth investigating in
this context include the issue of rigidity of product and labor
markets. As showed by Buti et al. (2010), governments intro-
ducing policy changes tend to be voted out of office in countries
with rigid product and labor markets. This in turn may provide
J. Fałkowski, A. Olper/ Agricultural Economics 00 (2013) 1–16 15
politicians to behave strategically. Provided that agricultural
sector is one of the most important stage for the restructuring
process, this may prove to be an interesting line of research.
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